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Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein: 
How a Small Town Case Made it Big
Eric Tucker
A centrAl problem for any regime of industrial legality is to define the 
scope for workers’ collective action. One characteristic of the post-World 
War II regime in Canada, commonly known as industrial pluralism, is that 
it failed to resolve that issue definitively. Most labour relations acts imposed 
procedural and time constraints on strikes and lockouts, but left the courts 
to regulate strike activity according to the body of common law they had de-
veloped in earlier periods. This produced tension within the regime; clearly 
legislatures intended that there should be some space for workers’ collective 
action, but, given its historic role as defender of private property and free-
dom of contract, the judiciary tended to define the boundaries of this space 
very narrowly.
Although this tension was constant, its salience and visibility varied 
greatly, depending on the level and scope of industrial conflict. In the per-
iod following the post-war strike wave of 1946–47,1 labour-management 
conflict settled down throughout most of Canada, as did legal contestation 
over the rules of the game.2 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, ten-
sions were beginning to rise again. Declining rates of growth, productivity, 
and profit led some employers to adopt a tougher attitude toward unions, 
while unions that had achieved a modicum of institutional security were 
facing stagnating membership growth and threats to existing standards. As 
a result, not only did the incidence of industrial conflict begin to increase 
nationally and in Ontario, but so too did its intensity; strikes became more 
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violent and unions renewed the use of some older tactics, like consumer 
boycotts and picketing, that challenged the boundaries of judicially defined 
industrial legality.3
Harry Arthurs, writing in 1960, colourfully captured one view of the 
growing sense of crisis produced by this confrontation: “The lusty and for-
givable infant that was trade unionism fifteen years ago has developed in 
public, legislative, and judicial imagery, into a churlish adolescent.”4 The call 
to make trade unions “responsible” was being revived in a number of influ-
ential arenas. From the perspective of trade unionists, however, the imagery 
was quite different. They perceived employers becoming more antagonistic, 
governments passing labour legislation hostile to union interests, and judges 
unfairly granting injunctions against picketing.5
Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein6 provides an excellent prism through 
which to view that moment of renewed conflict and understand how and 
why a tiny labour dispute in small-town Ontario in 1962 created a major 
precedent that significantly restricted the scope for workers’ collective ac-
tion over the next forty years by holding, in legal parlance, that secondary 
picketing was per se tortious, which means that any picketing at a site other 
than the struck employer’s place of business was unlawful and could be pro-
hibited by law.7
Beginning in Belleville
our story proper begins at Deacon Brothers Sportswear Ltd., a men’s sports-
wear manufacturer in Belleville, Ontario, a small regional trading town.8 
Deacon Brothers Sportswear traced its roots to 1897 when William B. Dea-
con opened a menswear store. In 1903 William B. closed the retail operation 
to focus on the production of men’s shirts. During World War I, the Dea-
con Shirt Company obtained contracts to manufacture military uniforms. 
William B.’s brother, Fred S. Deacon, joined the company in 1914. William 
B.’s oldest son, Fred H. Deacon, joined the business 1923, and his younger 
brother John followed in 1936. The company expanded its business after the 
war to include men’s leisure wear, and changed its name to Deacon Brothers 
Ltd. During World War II the company produced shirts and outerwear for 
the military and in 1941 it constructed a new plant, where it remained until it 
closed in 1990. After the war, the company’s business expanded as it moved 
into outdoor wear, which it marketed chiefly through independent mens-
wear stores across Canada.9 Following the deaths of William B. and Fred S. 
Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein: How a Small Town Case Made it Big • 219
Deacon in the 1940s, the firm was operated by William B.’s sons; John was 
primarily responsible for production, and Fred. H. for sales.
Up to this point, the company’s employees had never been unionized, 
despite the strong presence of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW) 
in the men’s clothing industry. The ACW was founded in 1913 by a group 
of secessionists from the United Garment Workers (UGW) who were dis-
satisfied with the leadership’s focus on organizing native-born workers in 
small towns. The ACW, in contrast, concentrated its efforts on the urban 
immigrant workforce in the men’s clothing industry, which it successfully 
organized in Toronto, Montreal, and Winnipeg.10 In 1960 it had forty locals 
and 15,000 members. The UGW survived as a minor player in the garment 
industry; in 1960 it had twelve locals scattered across the country and 2,000 
members.11
What led the ACW to Belleville in the late 1950s? According to Stanley 
Clair, then the Ontario director of the ACW union-label department and 
president of the Canadian Labour Congress trade union label department, 
Deacon Brothers was the only major clothing manufacturer not under union 
contract and their wage scale was 25 percent lower than the ACW’s, a claim 
that Fred B. disputed.12 In 1959 the ACW commenced an organizing drive 
at Deacon Brothers among the largely female, Canadian-born workforce of 
about ninety full-time production employees. Under Ontario labour law at 
the time, the union could be certified either by signing up 55 percent or more 
of the bargaining unit employees as members, or by winning an election, 
which would be held if the union could demonstrate that at least 45 percent 
of the employees were members.13 The union signed up enough employees 
to get an election, but not enough to be certified on the basis of member-
ship evidence alone. The ACW lost the October 1959 election thirty-four to 
forty-three,14 but continued the organizing drive. Presumably as part of a 
union avoidance strategy, Deacon Brothers participated in the creation of 
the Belle-Tex Association, which applied for certification in May 1960.15 The 
ACW intervened and the application was dismissed by the Ontario Labour 
Relations Board (OLRB) on the ground of employer involvement.16
Notwithstanding this finding, Deacon Brothers entered into a collective 
agreement with Belle-Tex Association, dated 7 July 1960. This action proved 
futile. The ACW subsequently signed up more than 55 percent of Deacon 
Brothers employees and was certified without a vote in August 1960 for a 
unit consisting of seventy-two production employees. The OLRB dismissed 
the argument of the Belle-Tex Association that the existence of a collective 
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agreement between it and Deacon Brothers made the ACW’s application 
untimely: because of the employer involvement, the 7 July agreement was 
found not to be a collective agreement within the meaning of the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA).17
Some bargaining between the ACW and Deacon Brothers followed, but 
no agreement was reached. An unsuccessful conciliation process was com-
pleted on 19 January 1961, putting the union in a legal strike position, yet for 
reasons about which we can only speculate, no strike was called. The most 
likely explanation is that although the union enjoyed majority support, it 
lacked the solidarity needed to win a strike. It is also possible that the union 
supporters, lacking any previous union experience, were uncomfortable 
with the idea of strikes and picketing. Finally, the ACW itself had developed 
a harmonious relationship with most employers in the men’s clothing in-
dustry based upon industrial standards legislation passed in the 1930s and 
third-party arbitration to resolve most disputes.18 According to Stanley Clair, 
the “Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America has a policy of avoiding 
strikes whenever possible . . .”19 Indeed, it had not conducted a strike in Can-
ada in the thirty-five years before 1962.20
Meanwhile, changes were also taking place at Deacon Brothers. Fred H. 
died in 1958 and his son, Fred B. (hereinafter referred to as Fred), took his 
place in the fall of 1959 after graduating from the Ivey School of Business Ad-
ministration at the University of Western Ontario. Within a short time, dis-
agreements with his uncle John over the future of the company resulted in 
Fred buying out John and reorganizing the firm as Deacon Brothers Sports-
wear Ltd. in December 1961. Fred did not recall having any dealings with the 
union prior to, or at the time of taking over the company.21
This changed in the summer of 1962 when, according to Fred, he received 
a phone call from ACW representatives in New York who wished to meet 
with him. Fred contacted his lawyer, Hugh Gibson, in Kingston, Ontario, 
who advised that he should agree to meet since Deacon Brothers Sportswear 
Ltd. was the successor to Deacon Brothers and so the union remained the 
certified bargaining agent. Based on subsequent statements made by Fred in 
the press, however, it also seems he did not believe that the union enjoyed 
majority support.22 Not surprisingly, the subsequent meeting did not go 
well. According to Fred, the union representatives arrived at his office and 
demanded that he sign a collective agreement they had prepared in advance. 
The talks ended quickly. Then, according to Fred, the union representatives 
subsequently met with the employees. He does not know what transpired at 
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the meeting, but we can assume the union decided that a strike by Deacon 
Brothers Sportswear employees was not a viable option.23
Later that summer, Fred received a phone call from William Hersee, 
the manager of Hersee’s Men’s Wear in Woodstock, Ontario, advising him 
that he had been requested to stop doing business with Deacon Brothers 
Sportswear. How and why did the locus and subject of the dispute shift from 
stalled negotiations with a Belleville manufacturer to a retail store in Wood-
stock, more than 300 kilometres away? There is no direct evidence of the 
chain of communication, but we can surmise that the ACW officials who 
failed to obtain a collective agreement at Deacon Brothers Sportswear re-
quested the assistance of both the ACW and the Canadian Labour Congress 
(CLC) union label departments to promote a boycott of Deacon Brothers 
Sportswear clothing in order to pressure the company to sign a collective 
agreement. At the time, both were headed by Stanley Clair.24 It is not clear 
whether Clair was acting in his CLC or his ACW capacity, or both, but this 
response went beyond the CLC union label department’s normal work of 
promoting the purchase of clothing with the union label through displays 
at fairs and trade union events, or the distribution of promotional material 
at shopping plazas.25 Instead, on 22 August, Stanley Clair traveled from his 
home in Windsor to Hersee’s Men’s Wear in Woodstock.
Hersee’s was a family-owned men’s and boy’s clothing retail business that 
was started in about 1920 by William F. and L. Beverley Hersee. The Her-
see family had deep roots in Woodstock, a community that was home to a 
number of industrial establishments, including the Gardner-Denver Co., a 
heavy equipment manufacturer, and York Knit, the manufacturer of Harvey 
Woods underwear.26 There is no indication why Clair selected Woodstock 
or Hersee’s, but what followed is fairly clear, notwithstanding some dispute 
over the details. Clair approached William Hersee, the proprietor of the store, 
identifying himself either as the CLC or the ACW union label department 
director.27 He was accompanied by Charles E. Carson, secretary-treasurer of 
the local labour council. Clair asked Hersee if his store did business with 
Deacon Brothers Sportswear. Upon receiving a positive response, Clair asked 
Hersee to write or telephone Deacon Brothers Sportswear letting it know that 
he had been called upon by local labour representatives asking him to protest 
the fact that its goods were not union-made. Clair also allegedly asked Hersee 
to cancel outstanding orders but, in any event, according to William Hersee, 
there were no outstanding orders at the time. Hersee let Clair know that he 
had no intention of complying with his request.
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Presumably it was after this first encounter that Hersee called Fred Dea-
con. In a newspaper interview, Hersee reported that he received a letter from 
Fred Deacon on 24 August stating that, in his view, the union only repre-
sented a minority of the employees and that the company would only dis-
cuss a contract with the union when it could prove to management it enjoyed 
majority support. Deacon’s letter also stated his opinion that, if the union 
did represent the majority, it would close the plant by simply walking off the 
job.28 In short, Fred dared the union to strike.
Clair and Carson returned the following day to ask Hersee whether he 
had given their request further thought. When Hersee again indicated he 
had no intention of acceding to their demands, Clair advised that he was 
planning an educational program to be carried out by picketing and the dis-
tribution of leaflets at the premises of some retailers for the purpose of advis-
ing members of the public that Deacon Brothers Sportswear’s goods were not 
union-made.29 Hersee told them that if that was their attitude they should go 
ahead. They did; on Tuesday, 28 August 1962, Clair and Peter Goldstein, a 
representative of the ACW, appeared outside of Hersee’s dressed in suits and 
carrying placards advising shoppers that Deacon Brothers Sportswear, made 
by non-union labour, was being sold at Hersee’s.
This was not the first time the ACW had picketed a retail store or been 
taken to court over such tactics,30 but the legal consequences of this action 
were to have far-reaching implications for the Canadian labour movement.
Mobilizing Working-Class Purchasing Power:  
“The Secret Weapon Of Trade Unionism”31
While historicAlly the lAbour movement primarily gained bargaining lever-
age by withdrawing labour at the point of production, these events indicate 
that it also resorted to strategies that aimed to discourage suppliers, distribu-
tors, and customers from doing business with employers who failed to pay 
union wages or sign collective agreements. Our focus here is on consumer 
boycotts and the tactics used to make them effective. One of the earliest was 
the union label campaign, which encouraged workers and their families to 
purchase union-made goods by identifying them with a label that unionized 
manufacturers were authorized or required to put on their products. This 
tactic originated in the United States in the 1870s, and was used by white, 
unionized cigar makers to discourage consumers from buying cigars pro-
duced by Chinese immigrants. During the 1880s, the Knights of Labor and 
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craft unionists associated with the American Federation of Labor adapted 
the tactic to mark consumer products made by their members. In the first 
decades of the twentieth century, both the International Ladies Garment 
Workers and the UGW relied heavily on the union label as an alternative to 
the use of strikes.32
The tactic also gained popularity among Canadian unions. In 1895 the 
Toronto Trades and Labour Council organized the Union Label League, and 
shortly thereafter it published a directory which included pages from the 
Journeymen Tailors’ Union and the United Garment Workers promoting 
their labels.33
The Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC) also became actively 
involved in promoting the union label at this time, incorporating a demand 
into its 1898 Platform of Principles that the union label be placed on all manu-
factured goods where practicable and on all government and municipal 
Stanley Clair and Peter Goldstein, outside Hersee’s Men’s Wear 
Daily Sentinel Review [Woodstock] (28 August 1962) 1
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supplies.34 Although local unions and their coun-
cils continued to promote the union label, interest 
seems to have tailed off in the period between the 
world wars, but revived in the 1950s, perhaps in re-
sponse to the growth of consumer spending.35 The 
TLC re-created a union label department in 1952, 
which continued as a department of the (CLC) after 
its founding in 1956. Stanley Clair, president of the 
Windsor union label council and the ACW’s Ontario 
union label director, became its president.36
The mobilization of consumer spending “as the 
secret weapon of trade unionism” was not limited 
to labelling products and encouraging consumers to 
buy union. Unions also resorted to so-called nega-
tive boycotts that involved efforts to actively dis-
courage vendors from carrying “unfair” products 
and purchasers from buying them. Tactics ranged 
from maintaining “we don’t patronize” lists to more 
active measures, including the ones that occurred at 
Hersee’s in Woodstock. These kinds of measures were adopted in both the 
United States and Canada beginning in the 1880s but their legality was chal-
lenged in the courts.37
By The Time We Got to Woodstock: Legal Regulation of 
Labour Boycotts And Picketing
the fundAmentAl legAl question in Hersees was whether and in what circum-
stances individuals could be held liable for intentionally inflicting economic 
harm on another. Although the English courts rejected the general proposition 
that the intentional infliction of economic harm was an unlawful act in and of 
itself (tortious), they were nevertheless prepared to impose liability in some 
circumstances and developed a number of specific torts, including inducing 
breach of contract and civil conspiracy to injure, for this purpose.38
When picketing was added to the mix of tactics, legal issues became 
more complicated. At the time, the law was concerned with three aspects of 
picketing: its form; its purpose; and its result. In general, peaceful picketing 
that aimed to provide information or persuade individuals to engage in ac-
tions they were lawfully entitled to pursue was lawful. Picketing became il-
Union Label, United 
Garment Workers of 
America, Toronto Trades 
and Labour Council 
Directory (c. 1895)
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legal because of its form if it involved criminal behaviour or the commission 
of nominate torts such as trespass, nuisance, intimidation, and defamation, 
and it became illegal in its purpose or result when it aimed to or persuaded 
people to commit unlawful acts including breaches of statute, civil conspir-
acies, or breaches of contract. This meant that the legality of picketing was in 
part determined by what courts considered to be an inducement of a breach 
of contract or a civil conspiracy to injure.39
A final legal consideration was the procedure governing the availability 
of injunctions to stop picketing. As a general matter, injunctions are an equit-
able remedy available to a party in a civil action on both a permanent and 
an interlocutory (before there has been a final determination of the merits) 
basis. The controversial area was with respect to the latter. In principle, inter-
locutory injunctions are available on the basis of three factors: the relative 
strength of the cases; irreparable harm; and the balance of convenience. By 
1962, courts had adopted the practice of readily granting interlocutory in-
junctions to halt labour picketing, often doing so initially on an ex parte appli-
cation, meaning that the union did not even get notice of the proceeding.40
While the question of the legality of union labels, union-led consumer 
boycotts, and picketing in support of boycotts was formally resolved by 
the application of English common law, as described above, it would be 
a mistake to proceed on the assumption that judges were sticklers for the 
formal rules they themselves constructed. Rather, as we shall see, the out-
come of cases depended at least as much on the attitudes of the judiciary 
toward workers’ collective action, on the broader environment in which 
they operated.
The legality of having union labels attached to union-made products was 
not challenged in Canada or the United States.41 Indeed, Canadian courts 
upheld legal actions against individuals for fraudulent use of the union label 
and, in 1927, after nearly thirty years of trying, the TLC succeeding in get-
ting trademark legislation amended to allow registration of union labels. 
The TLC promptly registered its own label the following year.42 As well, the 
legality of unions positively encouraging their members and the public to 
buy products bearing the union label or to patronize unionized businesses 
was not questioned.
The law became less clear when labour unions initiated negative cam-
paigns, for example, urging consumers not to purchase goods of a particular 
producer or not to patronize listed businesses. The first challenge occurred 
in the United States in the 1880s when bakers in New York City were convicted 
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of a criminal conspiracy for calling upon consumers to boycott Mrs. Gray’s 
bakery. Criminal prosecutions followed in other states and American judges 
also began to adapt the common law to hold that labour boycotts were civil 
conspiracies. Judges also crafted effective remedies, providing injunctive 
relief and holding trade union officials and members personally liable for 
damages.43
Some Canadian employers were inspired by these US developments, but 
were not nearly as successful. As a general matter, Canadian courts relying 
on English precedent rejected the view that a union-led consumer boycott 
targeting the employer with which it was having a dispute was tortious.44 
Similarly, picketing that was otherwise lawful did not become tortious be-
cause the picketers called for a primary boycott.45 The situation began to 
change, however, when secondary action was involved. Prior to 1962, sec-
ondary action was not a legal term of art; its usage in Canada seems to have 
originated in a 1956 study by Alfred W.R. Carrothers, a labour law professor, 
where he used the label, “secondary” (initially in quotation marks), to iden-
tify one of a series of factual situations in which courts were likely to find 
picketing unlawful because of its objects.46 After examining a series of cases 
which fit this category, Carrothers concluded:
[W]here picketing occurs in a location where there is no labour dispute the 
picketing is not necessarily unlawful, but the further the picketing is re-
moved from a labour dispute the more likely it will be interpreted as intimi-
dation, as a conspiracy to injure or to induce an illegal strike, or as intended 
to induce a breach of contract. And the propensity of secondary picketing for 
illegality is increased where the picketing does not reach the public.47
 The essential feature of secondary picketing was that it occurred at a lo-
cation where there was no active labour dispute, most typically at a location 
other than the struck employer’s place of business. By the early 1960s, the 
issue of the legality of secondary picketing in support of a consumer boy-
cott had been considered in several more cases. Although some judges had 
expressed the view that such activity was per se wrongful, other illegalities 
were also present in those cases, and so their outcome did not depend on 
that view.48 Carrothers was attentive to these developments and in 1962 pub-
lished an article entitled “Secondary Picketing” in which he reviewed the 
English and American law on the subject and then turned to Canada, where 
he found surprisingly little attention had been paid to secondary picketing. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of a small, but growing body of cases, Carrothers 
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concluded that Canadian judges were deciding the cases based on evalua-
tion “as to whether the interests prejudiced by the picketing should prevail 
over the interests which the picketing is calculated to advance” but that this 
was being disguised by “invocation of the common law relating to civil con-
spiracy, inducing breach of contract and interference with favourable trade 
relationships, by the attribution of motive stemming from the invocation of 
pejorative adjectives, and from inferences based on tortious elements in the 
manner in which the picketing is carried out.”49
The growing judicial hostility to secondary action was not isolated. 
Legislatures too were under pressure from employers to enact restrictive 
legislation. In British Columbia, employer lobbying yielded legislation in 
1954 and 1959 that aimed to deter unlawful strikes and make unions more 
liable for illegal activities. The 1959 amendment specifically prohibited sec-
ondary action.50 In Ontario, the government appointed a select legislative 
committee in 1957 to conduct a review of the operation of the LRA.51 In its 
report, issued in 1958, the committee endorsed the principles of industrial 
voluntarism in its broad terms, while seeking to refine its implementation.52 
The labour movement viewed it otherwise, seeing its recommendation as 
tilted heavily in favour of employers who had argued that unions needed 
to be subject to great legal discipline to make them more responsible.53 One 
controversial recommendation was to prohibit picketing an employer who 
was not a party to a labour dispute.54 Following a provincial election in 1959 
that returned another Progressive Conservative government, and after some 
behind-the-scenes maneuvering, in 1960 the government amended the LRA. 
Although the government did not implement the recommendations that 
trade unionists found most objectionable, it did seek to better deter unlawful 
strike activity by prohibiting persons from doing any act that as a reason-
able consequence might cause an unlawful strike or act. The effect of this 
law would be to prohibit secondary picketing that aimed to induce the em-
ployees at the secondary site to strike unlawfully. It did not, however, go as 
far a the committee had recommended and prohibit secondary picketing in 
support of a consumer boycott.55
Events after 1960 intensified the debate over the legal regulation of work-
ers’ collective action. Residential construction strikes in metropolitan To-
ronto in 1960 and 1961, and a Teamsters’ strike in the spring of 1962 were 
conducted in violation of the LRA and were accompanied by violence.56 The 
Ontario Attorney General, Kelso Roberts, issued a statement on 20 June 1961 
calling for all citizens, and especially those involved in the construction dis-
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pute, to obey the law and warned that instructions to enforce the law had 
been issued to Ontario Provincial Police, who would be assisting local po-
lice.57 Also during the summer of 1962, inter-union conflicts on the Great 
Lakes were accompanied by violence and disrupted shipping.58 The editorial 
writers at the Globe and Mail denounced the irresponsibility of union leaders 
and called for more stringent enforcement of the law as well as legislation to 
make labour leaders legally liable for the unlawful actions of their members. 
These editorialists also expressed alarm at the spread of disputes beyond 
the immediate parties. For example, in response to the secondary picketing 
that occurred during the construction strikes, the Globe and Mail warned: 
“What happens here in the next few years will determine whether Canada 
can devise an orderly and sensible system of labour relations or whether the 
law of the jungle is to continue until it involves the whole nation-labor, man-
agement and the public alike.”59 Finally, in late July 1962, editorialists at both 
the Globe and Mail and the more labour-friendly Toronto Star denounced the 
tactics of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters during a strike against a tannery: 
the strikers picketed the homes of men who continued to work, the factories 
that used the leather to manufacture shoes, and retail establishments where 
the shoes were sold.60
A Small Town Case Makes it Big: From Woodstock to Toronto
the picketing in front of Hersee’s continued on the 29th and 30th of Au-
gust. Fred Deacon sent a letter to the Woodstock Sentinel Review in support of 
William Hersee and denounced the ACW’s actions. To further demonstrate 
how distant Hersee was from the dispute, Deacon wrote that the store did 
not have any orders with his firm. He also provided his side of the dispute 
with the ACW and condemned the union’s tactics in language that reson-
ated with that of the Globe and Mail editorialists. “The union has intimidated 
retail stores throughout the province. They have demanded that retailers 
cancel orders with this company or face the embarrassment of having their 
stores picketed. This is an affront to our democratic way of life.”61
William Hersee clearly had Fred Deacon’s moral support, but Deacon in-
sists that was all — and that he did not help finance the litigation.62 In any 
event, Hersee was angry and upset about the picketing and on 30 August his 
lawyer, William E.G. Young,63 filed for and obtained an ex parte injunction, 
based entirely on an affidavit by Hersee.64 There was nothing exceptional 
about this; in Ontario ex parte injunctions were routinely being granted, even 
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after the minor amendments to the Judicature Act in 1960.65 One indication of 
just how normal the practice had become is that the county court judge who 
issued the injunction, Eric W. Cross, was also a well-regarded labour arbitra-
tor who heard numerous cases coming out of the large unionized industrial 
plants in southern Ontario.66
After the injunction was issued, the picketing was called off, but for rea-
sons that are not apparent, Hersee sought to have the injunction continued. 
An application needed to be made in the Supreme Court of Ontario and so 
Young called upon his firm’s Toronto agent, Kimber and Dubin. The firm, 
and its principal lawyer, Charles Dubin, had acted in the past for both or-
ganized labour and management. Horace Krever, a member of the firm who 
graduated from Osgoode Hall Law School and was called to the bar in 1956, 
took the brief.67
Unlike in the original application, the defendants got notice of the motion 
and retained John Osler to represent them. Osler was born into an upper-
middle class family in Winnipeg in 1915 but was radicalized in his university 
years and became an active socialist and member of the Co-operative Com-
monwealth Federation (CCF). He graduated from Osgoode Hall Law School 
and was called to the bar in 1940. Following military service during World 
War II, Osler returned to Toronto where he joined up with fellow CCFers Ted 
Joliffe and Bert Carson to start what was to become the leading union-side 
labour law practice in Ontario.68 For the purpose of defending the motion, 
Osler filed an affidavit sworn by Stanley Clair.
The motion was argued on 14 September 1962 before Mr. Justice J.C. Mc-
Ruer, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Ontario. This might have seemed 
like a good draw for the plaintiff; although McRuer was not unsympathetic 
to workers, and recognized that they enjoyed a right to engage in peaceful 
picketing, even in support of an unlawful strike, he had expressed strong 
doubts about the legality of secondary action in a 1951 decision, General Dry 
Batteries:
I am not at all convinced that, in what one may call the guise of advancing 
their interest in a labour dispute, employees are entitled to bring external 
pressure to bear on others who are doing business with a particular person 
for the purpose of injuring the business of their employer so that he may ca-
pitulate in the dispute. It is one thing to exercise all the lawful rights to strike 
and the lawful rights to picket; that is a freedom that should be preserved 
and its preservation has advanced the interests of the labouring man and 
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the community as a whole to an untold degree over the last half-century. 
But it is another thing to recognize a conspiracy to injure so that benefits to 
any particular person or class may be realized. Further, if what any person 
or group of persons does amounts to a common nuisance to another what is 
being done may be restrained by an injunction.69
McRuer reiterated this concern about secondary action in a 1958 case involv-
ing picketing at a construction site for which there was no operative collect-
ive agreement, but, as in the previous case, he ultimately based his judgment 
on the ground that the picket line was inducing breaches of contract.70 This 
approach was reflective of McRuer’s preference to stay within, and strictly 
apply, well-established tort principles, rather than to stray too deeply into a 
field that he regarded as being “not too well settled as yet.”71
No written submissions were made to McRuer and there is no record of 
the oral arguments, so we cannot know the strategies adopted by counsel. 
McRuer reserved judgment, presumably to give him time to review the evi-
dence and reflect on the law.
While McRuer was considering the case, Stanley Clair decided to continue 
the Union Label Department’s campaign against Deacon Brothers Sports-
wear. On 20 September, Clair appeared in front of Shaw’s Men’s Clothing 
Store in Belleville, the home of Deacon Brothers Sportswear, and later moved 
across the street to Meagher’s, another men’s clothing store. Clair, however, 
had learned something from his experience in Woodstock. At no point did 
he speak directly to the owner of either store and at the bottom of the picket 
sign, printed in smaller lettering, it was stated that the picketing was not 
directed against the merchants. In an interview with the local reporter, Clair 
emphasized that he was not asking people to boycott the stores or asking the 
merchants being picketed to boycott Deacon Brothers Sportswear. Rather, 
he said, the pickets were “just to educate the consumer.” Fred Deacon was 
not pleased. He told the reporter that the situation was “serious” and again 
denied that the union really represented his workers, evidenced by the fact 
that it did not call a strike. He also stated that there was nothing Deacon 
Brothers Sportswear could do to stop the picketing, although he noted that 
merchants in Woodstock had succeeded in obtaining a judgment. Belleville 
police stated they would not intervene as long as the picketing was peace-
ful and did not obstruct traffic.72 As far as can be determined, the picketing 
lasted for one day. There is also one report of picketing in Trenton, Ontario 
but the day and target have not been identified.73
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By this time it was clear that the ACW was losing support among the em-
ployees at Deacon Brothers Sportswear. Sometime in September or October, 
an application for decertification was made to the OLRB, although it was dis-
missed because the board was not satisfied there was no employer involve-
ment in the petition. Around the same time, perhaps out of desperation, the 
ACW sought the OLRB’s consent to prosecute Deacon Brothers Sportswear, 
apparently for violating its duty to bargain in good faith, but the application 
was withdrawn.74
McRuer issued his judgment on 23 October. Whatever temptation he may 
have felt to give effect to his concerns about secondary action and hold it per 
se tortious, he clearly resisted it. Rather, he took the position that for there to 
be liability, it was necessary to find that the secondary action involved the 
commission of a nominate tort previously recognized by the courts. More-
over, McRuer was scrupulous in applying the law to the facts disclosed in 
the affidavits of William Hersee and Stanley Clair.75 There was no suggestion 
of a trespass; picketing was not per se a nuisance and there was no evidence 
of a nuisance on the facts of this case; there was no conspiracy to bring about 
a breach of contract since the affidavit evidence of Hersee made it clear that 
Stanley Clair in Belleville
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there was no contract between Hersee’s and Deacon Brothers Sportswear at 
the time of the picketing; and, finally, there was no civil conspiracy to injure 
because the evidence did not establish an intention to injure the plaintiff 
distinct from the main intention of benefiting the union.76
One week later the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and Krever subse-
quently submitted a written memorandum of fact and law that set out the 
case to be argued. Krever adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, 
he argued that the picketing did fit within one of the existing nominate torts, 
notably civil conspiracy to injure and inducing breach of contract. With re-
gard to the civil conspiracy claim, Krever argued that the affidavit evidence 
established that this was not merely “an educational campaign” but rather 
a concerted effort to harm Hersee’s because of the store’s refusal to comply 
with the defendants’ demands. In support of this argument, Krever urged 
the court to take notice that, given the development of trade unionism and 
the ethic that “it was almost a treasonous act for one to cross a picket line,” 
a picket line’s purpose was never merely to communicate information, but 
to cause economic loss to the business whose premises are being picketed.77 
Krever also argued that the picketing was illegal (and implied it was also 
criminal) insofar as it attempted to require a person not to do something that 
he had a legal right to do.78 Later in the memorandum, Krever also argued 
that quite apart from conspiracy, the picketing was in violation of a new 
tort, recently recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Therien 
case — interference with the right to trade by unlawful means — and that 
there was a conspiracy to induce a breach of contract.79
The second prong of Krever’s strategy built on the observations made by 
Carrothers, discussed earlier, that the courts were operating on the under-
lying, unspoken principle that the right to trade should take precedence over 
the freedom to engage in secondary picketing. Thus, following his discus-
sion of the elements of conspiracy, Krever directly addressed the secondary 
character of the action. He argued that it was never in the contemplation of 
the courts that members of a union could legitimately inflict harm on an 
innocent person who had dealings with the employer. He went on to urge 
that it was the function of the law to strike a proper balance between com-
peting rights and that courts had wisely allowed workers to work together 
to advance their interest by interfering with a person with whom they had 
a direct conflict, but that the law of conspiracy did not permit interference 
with the right to trade of persons who were far removed from that dispute. 
Finally, he argued that the right to free speech was properly limited to pre-
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vent one party from causing unnecessary harm to another who is some 200 
miles away from the scene of the real dispute.80
Although these arguments were made in support of the claim that the 
picketing was wrongful as a civil conspiracy to injure, one paragraph later 
the memorandum offered the courts another alternative:
[I]t is submitted that secondary picketing, in the circumstances of this case, 
is illegal. Except for the Judgment appealed from, in all cases in which Can-
adian Courts have considered secondary picketing, whether directly or obi-
ter dictum, judicial opinion has been that secondary picketing is illegal.81
In support of that proposition, Krever cited a number of cases, including of 
course, McRuer’s own observations in General Dry Batteries, as well as four 
other cases in which secondary boycotts had been held to be civil conspir-
acies to injure.82
In short, the brief not only provided the Ontario Court of Appeal with 
several legal pegs on which it could hang its judgment — including the op-
tion of doing directly what courts had been doing indirectly and holding 
secondary picketing to be per se tortious — but also invoked broad legal prin-
ciples that could be used to give support for the growing sentiment among 
many judges and opinion leaders like the Globe and Mail that workers’ col-
lective action needed to be curtailed in order to limit the ability of unions to 
disrupt the economy and interfere with trade.
The defendants’ brief, prepared by Osler, was, well, briefer. It emphasized 
that the manner in which the picketing was conducted was lawful and that 
the defendants had every right to advise members of the public that some of 
the clothing being sold at Hersee’s was manufactured at a firm where union 
standards were not met. Osler also argued that the defendants had a right 
to persuade members of the public to prefer union-made goods and that the 
defendants were not limited to picketing at premises where there was an 
employer-employee relationship between the picketers and the proprietor 
of the premises. Finally, he argued there could not be liability for inducing 
a breach of contract because no contracts were in existence. In short, Osler’s 
strategy was to follow McRuer and argue that the defendants’ actions did 
not fall afoul of any nominate tort, while giving short shrift to the secondary 
action issue. This proved to be a mistake.
Oral argument was heard on 10 December in Toronto before Justices John 
Aylesworth, Frederick MacKay, and George McGillivray. Neither Justices 
MacKay nor McGillivray practiced labour law before their appointment to 
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the bench and, while on the bench, neither had ruled on a labour injunction 
case.83 Aylesworth, the most senior of the three, was an experienced manage-
ment-side labour lawyer in Windsor, who had represented major automobile 
companies and other heavy manufacturers prior to his appointment to the 
bench in 1946. As discussed in William Kaplan’s chapter in this collection, 
in 1943 Aylesworth appeared before the Select Committee of the Ontario 
Legislative Assembly holding hearings into proposed collective bargaining 
legislation, where he recommended that if compulsory collective bargaining 
legislation was to be adopted then it was necessary to ensure that it would 
promote improved industrial relations and impose greater responsibility 
on the part of “bargaining agencies.”84 He also represented Ford during the 
1945 strike that produced the Rand Formula.85 Despite his long tenure on the 
bench, prior to this case Aylesworth had only participated in one reported 
labour injunction case, in which he concurred with his two colleagues who 
wrote lengthy judgments.86
There is no report of the oral argument, and the court reserved judgment. 
In the meantime, another decertification application was made at Deacon 
Brothers Sportswear and this time the OLRB ordered that a vote be held 
on 17 December. The union lost by a vote of thirty-seven to thirty, and on 7 
January 1963 the OLRB formally terminated the ACW’s bargaining rights.87
Later that month there was one other event that contributed to the grow-
ing concern among certain circles that organized labour was out of control. A 
wildcat strike of 3,500 lumber and sawmill workers began on 14 January out-
side the northern Ontario town of Kapuskasing. Picketers targeted independ-
ent operators who continued to supply the struck mill with logs. Violent 
confrontations between the two groups climaxed tragically on 11 February 
when independent loggers fired into a large crowd of striking workers who 
were advancing toward their stockpile of logs at Reesor Siding. Three strikers 
were killed and many more were wounded.88 The Globe and Mail editorialists 
were quick to condemn the government for not providing enough police to 
stop the violence earlier and called for stronger laws to penalize irresponsible 
trade unionists who were blamed for inciting labour violence.89
The Court of Appeal issued its judgment on 27 February 1963, ruling in 
favour of Hersee’s.90 Aylesworth wrote the main opinion, with which both 
MacKay and McGillivray concurred, while MacKay provided additional 
reasons for allowing the appeal. Aylesworth’s and MacKay’s application of 
existing common law principles was, as Harry Arthurs’ later scathing case 
comment abundantly demonstrated,91 sloppy to say the least. Aylesworth 
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held that, contrary to McRuer, the picketing was tortious because it induced 
a breach of contract. To support this result, Aylesworth first had to find that 
there was a contract between Hersee’s and Deacon Brothers Sportswear, not-
withstanding that William Hersee’s affidavit expressly stated that at the time 
Clair approached him, there were no orders. To do this, Aylesworth pointed 
to a statement in Clair’s affidavit that Hersee showed him an invoice for an 
order already placed, but Aylesworth ignored the rest of Clair’s statement in 
which he stated that Hersee also told him that he had not placed an order 
for the fall. Moreover, he seemingly preferred Clair’s ambiguous statement 
to Hersee’s unequivocal statement that he had no outstanding orders with 
Deacon Brothers Sportswear, despite the fact that Hersee was in the best pos-
ition to know.92 Moreover, Aylesworth never noticed that the wrong plaintiff 
had brought the inducing breach of contract action since it was the innocent 
victim of the breach who was entitled to sue, not the person who allowed 
himself to be induced. From there his judgment rambled. Aylesworth noted, 
“In this day and age the power of organized labour is very far indeed from 
negligible.” He then took judicial notice of the power of a peaceful picket line 
to deter both union members and “members of the general public in a com-
munity where . . . there is widespread organization of labour” from doing 
business at picketed premises. Moreover, he found that the content of the 
picket signs was likely to confuse the public, making them think that Her-
see’s was in a dispute with organized labour. What any of this had to do with 
the tort of inducing breach of contract was never made clear, and Aylesworth 
concluded his analysis of this branch of the case by stating, without any an-
alysis, that the picketing was also criminal watching and besetting.93
MacKay’s analysis of civil conspiracy to injure was equally problematic. 
Not only did he find it difficult to see how the unionized employees of Dea-
con Brothers Sportswear could possibly gain economic leverage from the 
promotion of a consumer boycott of their employer’s products in Woodstock, 
but he also refused to accept there was a legitimate business justification for 
the union’s action because the harm being inflicted on Hersee’s outweighed 
the “negligible” benefit it would gain. Apart from his willful blindness, 
MacKay’s turn to interest balancing departed from earlier precedent which 
refused to give weight to the quantum of damages being inflicted once a 
legitimate purpose was established.94
To this point, Aylesworth’s and MacKay’s judgments were perfectly 
consistent with the observation made earlier by Carrothers that “the char-
acterization of secondary picketing as being unlawful on the basis of com-
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mon-law principles as they stand at present presents a colourful confusion 
of fact, inference, assumption, law and policy that would be kaleidoscopic 
in quality had it the saving grace of internal order.”95 The significance of the 
case, however, did not lie in its incremental contribution to the large pool of 
poorly crafted judgments in the tort law of picketing. Rather, what made the 
case precedent-setting was the court’s decision to take up the invitation in 
Krever’s brief and hold that secondary picketing was per se tortious and no 
longer had to be squeezed into the requirements of an existing tort. To justify 
this result, Aylesworth’s judgment relied in part on a sweeping assertion that 
the right to trade is “far more fundamental and of far greater importance” 
than the right (“if there be such a right”) to engage in secondary picketing, 
the former being for the benefit of the community, the latter for the benefit of 
a particular class.96 In reaching this conclusion, he never adverted to the fact 
that earlier in his judgment he took judicial notice of the fact that members 
of the public, particularly in working-class communities, are likely to choose 
not to cross a picket line to do business with a merchant selling goods made 
by workers not being paid union wages. Secondly, he also pointed to a line 
of cases in which courts had expressed their antipathy to secondary action, 
but admitted that in all those cases the picketing had been enjoined because 
of its illegality. Nevertheless, he chose to “view them as declaring secondary 
picketing to be illegal per se,”97 implying that his judgment was merely giving 
effect to existing precedent, when clearly it was not.
The defendants’ lawyer sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, but the motion was denied on 22 April 1963, in part because the 
ACW had been decertified as bargaining agent for Deacon Brothers Sports-
wear, although that hardly made the issue moot.
And the Rest Is History
so hoW did A small town case make it big? There really is no surprise here. 
It was a matter of the right case, at the right time, with the right people. The 
case was right because a court would have had to stretch to find any illegal-
ity based on the existing common law torts of nuisance, inducing breach of 
contract, or conspiracy to injure. It was also at the right time in the sense that 
among certain elites there was a growing sense that organized labour was 
out of control and needed to be made more responsible both for the violence 
that sometimes accompanied industrial disputes and for economic disrup-
tion caused by secondary action. Finally, there were the right people. Horace 
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Krever authored a brief that squarely invited the court to hold secondary ac-
tion per se illegal and provided them with broad legal principles, if not pre-
cedents, that supported this step, and John Aylesworth, who while in practice 
sought to make unions more legally responsible, now had the opportunity to 
do so as a judge by narrowing the scope for workers’ collective action.
But there is one other dimension to this case’s importance that this paper 
has not yet explored, and that is its widespread impact and durability. The 
decision was, after all, a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, and so 
was not binding in other provinces. Moreover, it could have been overturned 
by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) or by legislation. Yet, the tort of sec-
ondary picketing came to be accepted in most jurisdictions, was not legisla-
tively reversed, and was not overruled by the SCC until 2002.
The judgment did not attract much attention immediately after it was re-
leased. Yes, the Woodstock Sentinel-Review endorsed the court’s decision, but 
there were no editorials in the Globe and Mail or the Star.98 As mentioned, 
Harry Arthurs published a withering case comment in the Canadian Bar Re-
view in late 1963 that condemned the court’s flawed legal reasoning, includ-
ing its failure to notice that the tort was brought by the wrong plaintiff, and 
its sweeping policy pronouncements, while leaving open the possibility that 
a legislature might legitimately restrict secondary action.99 Excerpts of Ar-
thurs’ comment subsequently made their way into the Globe and Mail when 
Wilfred List, the paper’s labour reporter, chose to write up Arthurs’ criticism 
in an article provocatively entitled, “Picketing and the Law: Judge vs. Profes-
sor.” List focused more on Arthurs’ criticism of the court’s policy pronounce-
ments than on its legal reasoning, reproducing a passage in which Arthurs 
condemned the court’s assertion that individual and group interests should 
yield to the interests of the community as “an affirmation of totalitarian phil-
osophy quite inconsistent with constitutional government.”100
Whatever consternation these words may have stirred in the legal com-
munity, Arthurs’ critiques of Hersees gained little traction. The industrial 
relations community, informed as it was by the industrial pluralist per-
spective, would have agreed with his critique of the judiciary as reflexive-
ly hostile to collective action that interfered with private property rights. 
Therefore, they were poor judicial craftsmen and improperly manipulated 
the common law to achieve their desired results, and yet, they would have 
also shared the judiciary’s concern that industrial conflict needed to be con-
tained within narrow limits. While the legislature and not the judiciary 
should have made the decision about where to draw the line, the substan-
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tive result did not deeply offend the industrial pluralist view of the limits 
of industrial legality.
Indeed, even the labour movement did little to challenge the result in 
Hersees. Rather, its focus was almost exclusively on the easy availability of 
ex parte and interlocutory injunctions, a matter that was of concern before 
the Hersees judgment, but that grew in importance afterwards as a result of 
growing labour militancy that challenged the bounds of industrial legality.101 
In 1965 the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) published a report on injunc-
tions prepared by John Osler, the union counsel in Hersees, which focused 
on the unfairness of the procedures, but did not say a word about second-
ary action.102 The following year, the OFL made a special submission to the 
government on injunctions in labour disputes, in part as a result of their use 
in the Tilco strike.103 Again, the focus was on the use of injunctions, not the 
tort law of secondary picketing. In June 1966, the Ontario Minister of Labour 
commissioned a study on the role of labour injunctions in Ontario directed 
by Carrothers. Seven studies were produced, one of which was a study of the 
law of injunctions by Horace Krever, who had become a professor of law at 
the University of Toronto in 1964. Although his focus was on procedure, not 
substantive law, Krever was critical of the courts’ unwillingness to give the 
interests of labour the same weight as the interests of employers, and, ironic-
ally, cited the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Hersees as an example.104 Car-
rothers’ report made no formal recommendations and no action was taken, 
but before the study was released, the Ontario government appointed former 
Supreme Court of Canada Justice Ivan Rand to head a commission of inquiry 
into labour disputes.105 As well, late in 1966 the federal government established 
the Task Force on Labour Relations, one of whose members was Carrothers.
The OFL’s submissions to the Rand commission contained short sections 
defending the right to strike and picket, and a much longer section advo-
cating prohibition of the use of injunctions in labour matters, but no men-
tion was made of secondary picketing.106 Employer submissions, however, 
called specifically for picketing to be limited to the struck employer’s place 
of business.107 The Rand Report, published in 1968, contained sweeping rec-
ommendations for labour law reform, including a prohibition on secondary 
picketing and boycotts except in cases where the target had become an ally of 
the struck employer.108 The report was heavily criticized by the OFL, which 
for the first time specifically defended secondary action, calling for legisla-
tion to permit it.109 The OFL’s position was largely accepted by the federal 
Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein: How a Small Town Case Made it Big • 239
Task Force report, which recommended that secondary picketing in support 
of consumer boycotts be permitted.110
Political support to overturn Hersees, however, did not materialize. In 
1970 a majority conservative Ontario government implemented some of 
Rand’s recommendations in amendments to the Labour Relations Act.111 The 
government also amended the Judicature Act to limit generally the availabil-
ity of injunctions in labour disputes, and specifically to restrict the use of ex 
parte injunctions.112 Although these measures were extensively debated, the 
question of secondary picketing or boycotts was never raised.113
In the period after 1970, courts in much of Canada continued to rely heav-
ily on Hersees and the sharp distinction that it drew between primary and 
secondary picketing. Indeed, this distinction was applied to the interpreta-
tion of the Judicature Act amendments, holding that its restrictions on grant-
ing injunctions in labour disputes did not apply to secondary picketing, since 
this was not picketing in a labour dispute.114 Given its significance, much liti-
gation focused on the boundary between primary and secondary picketing 
which, in turn, produced another round of critical academic commentary, 
leading David Beatty to write “so much has already been written of this area 
generally by Canadian labour law teachers who have been attracted to the 
topic with a child-like and absorbing pre-occupation” before he proceeded 
to make his own contribution.115
The reconfiguration of the line between primary and secondary picketing 
provided one avenue of retreat from Hersees, but in general movement was 
slow.116 Legislation in Manitoba in 1970 more severely restricted the avail-
ability of injunctions than in Ontario and it was interpreted by the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal as permitting secondary picketing that was otherwise law-
ful117 but, for the most part, there remained a high level of judicial hostility to 
secondary action in labour disputes and little political support for legislative 
action to reverse it. Indeed, in 1971 New Brunswick joined British Columbia 
and Newfoundland in limiting secondary action.118 Its eventual undoing by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the Pepsi case is a story for another day. It is, 
however, fair to speculate that the change was partly contingent on a shift in 
the judicial imagery of organized labour from the “churlish adolescent” that 
Harry Arthurs described in 1960 to that of a senior citizen who no longer 
poses a threat to others and is losing her capacity to cope in an increasingly 
hostile environment.119 Now that’s a labour movement the courts can trust to 
deliver autonomy, equality, and democracy to Canadian workers.120
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Postscript
the Workers of deAcon Brothers Sportswear were subsequently organized 
by the UGW, the more conservative historic rival of the ACW, in 1979. Ironic-
ally, the union organizer was Andre Bekerman, a self-described revolution-
ary socialist.121 After lengthy negotiations, the parties reached a collective 
agreement which was renewed several times until the company went out 
of business in 1991.122 Fred became a school trustee and conducted labour 
negotiations on the school board’s behalf. This turned into a career as a 
school board negotiator after Deacon Brothers Sportswear closed its doors. 
William Hersee continued to operate his clothing store in Woodstock until 
the early 1990s. He passed away in 2000.123 Hugh Gibson was appointed to 
the Exchequer court in 1964; John Osler was appointed to the High Court of 
Ontario in 1968; and Horace Krever followed him there in 1975. Krever went 
to the Court of Appeal in 1986 but is best known for his work leading several 
commissions, including the 1993 Commission of Inquiry on the Blood Sys-
tem of Canada.
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